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Tax Treaties-EXCHANGE OF INFORMATIONUSE OF IRS SUBPOENA 
POWER IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION- 
United States u. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2647 (1976). 
In late 1971 the Internal ~evenue  Service (IRS) issued ad- 
ministrative summonses to A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd. (Burbank) 
and the New York branch of the Bank of Tokyo requiring them 
to produce books and records relevant to the potential Canadian 
tax liability of Westward Shipping, Ltd. (Westward), a Canadian 
corporation. The summonses were issued by the IRS in response 
to a request for information by Canadian authorities. Westward 
filed written objections to the summonses, arguing that they were 
not authorized by the Internal Revenue Code or by the 1942 Tax 
Treaty between the United States and Canada.' The IRS re- 
sponded by issuing a new summons to Burbank, purporting to 
deal with Burbank's domestic tax liability but requesting the 
same materials as did the original summonses. When this new 
summons was challenged and stayed, the IRS sought enforce- 
ment of the original summonses in federal district court. In this 
proceeding, the IRS admitted that the information was sought 
because of the request by Canadian authorities for aid in their tax 
investigation of Westward and not because of any potential tax 
liability of the American corporations. The district court denied 
enf~rcement.~ On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit re~ersed,~ holding that the use of the IRS 
subpoena power solely to obtain information for use by Canadian 
authorities in a Canadian tax investigation was authorized by 
section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code and articles XIX and 
XXI of the 1942 Income Tax Treaty with Canada.' 
- 
1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United States- 
Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983. 
2. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9 9779 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 
1, 1974), reu'd, 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2647 (1976). 
The district court also denied Westward's motion to intervene, but allowed Burbank 
and the Bank of Tokyo to challenge the summonses. The denial of intervention was 
affirmed by the court of appeals. The intervention issue will not be treated in this case 
note. 
3. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9,13-14 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
96 S. Ct. 2647 (1976). 
4. 56 Stat. 1405, 1406. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. United States Income Tax Conventions 
The 1942 Income Tax Convention with Canada is one among 
twenty-two5 similar conventions concluded by the United States 
with various countries since 1939? Once ratified, these conven- 
tions are recognized by the courts as treaties and as part of the 
-- 
5. Treaties in force on January 1, 1976 with exchange of information provisions were: 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 14, 1953, United States-Australia, 
[I9531 4 U.S.T. 2274, T.I.A.S. No. 2880; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa- 
tion, Oct. 25, 1956, United States-Austria, [I9571 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 9, 1970, United States-Belgium, 
[I9721 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa- 
tion, May 6, 1948, United States-Denmark, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Convention 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 6, 1970, United States-Finland, [I9711 22 
U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 
28, 1967, United States-France, [I9681 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518; Convention 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Feb. 20, 1950, United States-Greece, [I9541 5 
U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 2902; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 7, 
1975, United States-Iceland, [I9751 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 8151; Convention for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Sept. 13, 1949, United States-Ireland, [I9511 2 U.S.T. 
2303, T.I.A.S. No. 2356; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 30,1955, 
United States-Italy, [I9561 7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S. No. 3679; Convention for the Avoid- 
ance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971, IJnited States-Japan, [I9721 23 U.S.T. 967, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7365; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 18, 1962, 
Luxembourg, [I9641 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726; Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 
1855; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 16, 1948, United States- 
New Zealand, [I9511 2 U.S.T. 2378, T.I.A.S. No. 2360; Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Norway, [I9721 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. 
No. 7474; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 1, 1957, United States- 
Pakistan, [I9591 10 U.S.T. 984, T.I.A.S. No. 4232; Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation, Dec. 13, 1946, United States-South Africa, [I9521 3 U.S.T. 3821, 
T.I.A.S. No. 2510; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 23, 1939, 
United States-Sweden, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958; Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, [I9511 2 U.S.T. 1751, 
T.I.A.S. No. 2316; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Jan. 9, 1970, United 
States-Trinidad and Tobago, [I9711 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047; Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation, July 22, 1954, United States-West Germany, [I9541 5 
U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133, as amended, Sept. 17,1965,16 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No. 
5920. 
On May 13, 1976, the Department of the Treasury announced that income tax treaty 
negotiations were underway or contemplated in the near future with Australia, Bangla- 
desh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, India, Iran, Jamaica, Malta, 
Morocco, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. 41 Fed. Reg. 
20,427 (1976). It was also announced that negotiations were nearly completed with Indone- 
sia, Kenya, Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan), and South Korea. Id. The following 
treaties had been signed: Cyprus (Apr. 19, 1974), Egypt (Oct. 28, 1975), Israel (Nov. 20, 
1975), and the United Kingdom (Dec. 31, 1975). The treaties with Egypt and Israel had 
also been submitted to the Senate for approval. Id. 
6. The earliest tax convention still in force was concluded in 1939 with Sweden. Supra 
note 5. 
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law of the land without any further legislative action.' This recog- 
nition arises from article VI of the Constitution, which places the 
Constitution, laws made in pursuance of the Constitution, and 
treaties made under the authority of the United States all on the 
same footing as the "supreme Law of the Land? A distinction 
is often made, however, between self-executing and nonself- 
executing treaties; the former being those that take domestic ef- 
fect upon ratification, the latter requiring enabling legislation? 
Income tax treaties considered by the courts have been regarded 
as self-executing . l0 
The purposes of tax treaties are to prevent double taxation 
(taxation by both countries) and tax evasion (taxation by neither 
country) in cases where a citizen of one country has income from 
sources within another country.ll In order to facilitate these pur- 
poses, the treaties usually contain provisions for the exchange of 
information between the two countries. Much information is 
exchanged on a routine basis, while more detailed information is 
exchanged upon specific request.12 For example, article XIX of 
7. Samann v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d 461, 463 (4th Cir. 1963); American Trust Co. v. 
Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: 
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Wright, Treaties as Law in National Courts: The United States, 16 LA. L. REV. 755, 
756 (1956) states: "In the United States, it is the general principle, deduced from article 
VI and other articles of the Constitution, that both treaties and customary international 
law are parts of the law of the land, directly applicable by the courts." 
9. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829): "Our constitution declares a 
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of 
any legislative provision." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 4 141 (1965) 
reads: 
§ 141. Effect of Treaty as Domestic Law 
(1) A treaty made on behalf of the United States . . . that manifests an inten- 
tion that it shall become effective as domestic law of the United States at the 
time it  becomes binding on the United States 
(a) is self-executing in that it is effective as domestic law of the United 
States, and 
(b) supersedes inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress or of the 
law of the several states of the United States. 
10. See 525 F.2d at  14, and cases cited note 7 supra. 
11. E.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United 
States-Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983. 
12. E.g., id. arts. XIX-XXI. 
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the Canadian treaty provides that each country will furnish the 
information that its authorities "have a t  their disposal or are in 
a position to obtain under its revenue laws" to the extent that 
such information may be of use to the other country in assessing 
taxed3 Article XXI states that upon request the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue may furnish Canadian authorities such infor- 
mation as he is "entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the 
United States."14 The reciprocal situation is also provided for.'" 
The use of the provisions to request specific information from 
United States tax authorities has been quite limited, except per- 
haps in the case of Canada,16 and there have been no prior judicial 
determinations of the validity or interpretation of the provi- 
sions. l7 
B. Applicable Sections of the Internal Revenue Code 
Tax treaties provide no independent compulsory process, but 
rather depend on provisions of the Internal Revenue Code? For 
instance, the Canadian treaty contains no independent power to 
13. Id. art. XIX: 
With a view to the prevention of fiscal evasion, each of the contracting 
States undertakes to furnish to the other contracting State, as provided in the 
succeeding Articles of this Convention, the information which its competent 
authorities have a t  their disposal or are in a position to obtain under its revenue 
laws in so far as such information may be of use to thc authorities of the other 
contracting State in the assessment of the taxes to which this Convention re- 
lates. 
The information to be furnished under the first paragraph of this Article, 
whether in the ordinary course or on request, may be exchanged directly be- 
tween the competent authorities of the two contracting States. 
14. Id. art. XXI: 
1. If the Minister in the determination of the income tax liability of any 
person under any of the revenue laws of Canada deems it necessary to secure 
the cooperation of the Commissioner, the Commissioner may, upon request, 
furnish the Minister such information bearing upon the matter as the Commis- 
sioner is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United States of 
America. 
2. If the Commissioner in the determination of the income tax liability of 
any person under any of the revenue laws of the United States of America deems 
it necessary to secure the cooperation of the Minister, the Minister may, upon 
request, furnish the Commissioner such information bearing upon the matter as 
the Minister is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of Canada. 
15. Id. 
16. Lazerow, The United States-French Income Tax Convention, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 
649, 723 (1971); Kronauer, Information Given for Tax Purposes from Switzerland to For- 
eign Countries Especially to the United States for the Prevention of Fraud or the Like in 
Relation to Certain American Taxes, 30 TAX L. REV. 47, 48 n.6 (1974). 
17. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1975). 
18. Id. at 12. 
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subpoena records, but allows exchange of such information as the 
IRS is entitled to obtain under existing United States revenue 
laws.lg Under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS 
may compel production of records for the following purposes: 
. . . [I] ascertaining the correctness of any return, [2] making 
a return where none has been made, [3] determining the liabil- 
ity of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at 
law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in 
respect of any internal revenue tax, or [4] collecting any such 
liability . . . . 
For these purposes the IRS can subpoena books, papers, records, 
and other data and require certain persons to appear and give 
testimony.20 The 1954 Internal Revenue Code also contains, in 
section 7852(d), a statement that "[nlo provision of this title 
shall apply in any case where its application would be contrary 
to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date 
of enactment of this title." 
C. Use of the IRS Subpoena Power under the Tax Conventions 
If there is a potential American tax liability, section 7602 of 
the Internal Revenue Code clearly authorizes use of the subpoena 
power by the IRS to investigate that liability. The specific issue 
raised in the instant case, however, is whether the section 7602 
subpoena power can be used to gather information in response to 
a request from Canada under the tax treaty when there is no 
concurrent domestic tax liability. In relation to that issue, the 
legislative history of the United States-Canada Tax Treaty and 
several others, the Government's interpretation of the Canadian 
treaty, and the provisions of three model income tax conventions 
will be examined. 
The amount of legislative material pertaining to the use of 
the subpoena power under the tax conventions is not large.21 The 
most extensive discussion of the administrative assistance as- 
pects of the treaties occurred during the Senate hearingsZ2 on a 
- -- 
19. Notes 13 & 14 supra. 
20. I.R.C. § 7602. 
21. The legislative reports, hearings, and debates on all the income tax conventions 
through 1961 are reprinted in 1 & 2 JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
or UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS (1962) [hereinafter cited as LEC. HIST. OF U.S. TAX 
CONV.]. 
22. Convention with France on Double Taxation: Hearings on Exec. A. Before a 
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 
reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX CONV., supra note 21, at 945-1129. 
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supplementary convention with France13 in 1947. This convention 
contained information exchange provisions similar to those in the 
1942 treaty with Canada.24 Much of the testimony, however, per- 
tained to provisions for mutual collection of taxes and to the 
amount of information that would be exchanged automatically. 
The question of whether the subpoena power was to be used to 
gather information in cases lacking concurrent liability was not 
discussed directly, although the tenor of the debate suggests that 
the participants assumed the subpoena power would be available 
for that purpose.25 
The report on the 1942 treaty with Canada sent to the Senate 
by the Acting Secretary of State states that the exchange of infor- 
mation provisions "mark an important step in the direction of 
fiscal cooperation between the two countries" and that the provi- 
sions "materially complement our domestic system of informa- 
tion a t  the source and, it is anticipated, will be of considerable 
value" in administering internal revenue laws. The report also 
states that the exchange articles would provide, on a reciprocal 
basis, general comprehensive information and "information in 
the case of specific taxpayers with respect to whom information 
is available in Canada."26 Although it does not deal specifically 
with the subpoena power, the report seems to indicate an expec- 
tation that  the information exchange provisions should have 
broad application. 
The floor debate on the Canadian treatyn deals more specifi- 
cally with the issue in the instant case. During that debate Sena- 
tor George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and floor 
manager of the treaty made the following statements: 
I do not think that there is anything in the convention 
which would require furnishing information beyond what each 
Government has the right to ask of its own citizens at the pres- 
ent time. 
. . . .  
. . . . The convention does not undertake to confer upon 
either the United States or Canada any extra power with respect 
23. Supplementary Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 18, 1946, 
United States-France, 64 Stat. pt. 3 at B3, T.I.A.S. No. 1982. 
24. Id. arts. 8, 11. 
25. See Hearings on Exec. A., supra note 22, at 28-45 (testimony of Mr. Carroll); id. 
at 68-77 (testimony of Mr. Fernald). 
26. Report of the Acting Secretary of State on S. Exec. B.,  77th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 
6, 1942, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX CONV., supra note 21, at 448-49. 
27. 88 CONG. REC. 4642-47, 4713-14 (1942), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX. 
CONV., supra note 21, at 461-70. 
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to inquiries made of the citizens of either country. It does not 
undertake to confer power upon Canada to make inquiry of an 
American citizen residing in the United States, or upon the 
United States to make inquiry of a Canadian citizen residing in 
Canada.28 
But later in the same debate the following exchange took place: 
Mr. TAFT. . . . 
In other words, if an American citizen were using a Cana- 
dian bank deposit to evade income taxation, I think the conven- 
tion would permit the United States Government to ask the 
Canadian Government to obtain information from its own bank 
and furnish it to this Government in connection with the en- 
forcement of our internal revenue laws. 
Mr. GEORGE. It does provide for exchange of informa- 
tion, as the Senator from Ohio points out. 
Mr. TAFT. But no general information of that kind would 
be requested except perhaps in specific cases in which inquiry 
was being made relative to income-tax evasion.29 
Senator Taft's remarks describe a situation in which Canada 
would be asked to subpoena records from a Canadian bank solely 
to aid an American tax investigation. Since the treaty was meant 
to operate reciprocally, if Senator Taft's understanding of the 
treaty was correct, the United States could be asked to use its 
subpoena power in the converse situation. It is significant that 
Senator George appears to have approved Senator Taft's state- 
ment. There was no dissenting argument by any of the Senators 
present. 
The 1962 Income Tax Treaty with Luxembourg contains pro- 
vision for the exchange of "information available under the re- 
spective taxation laws of the Contracting s t a t e ~ . " ~ ~  This is simi- 
lar to the language in the Canadian treaty describing the informa- 
tion to be exchanged as that which the authorities are in a posi- 
tion to obtain under their revenue laws.31 The Senate report ac- 
companying the Luxembourg treaty stated that: "The informa- 
tion to be exchanged is that which would be available under the 
taxation laws of the country to which the request for information 
is directed if the tax of the requesting country were its own tax."32 
28. Id. at 4714. 
29. Id. 
30. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 18, 1962, United States- 
Luxembourg, art. XWI, [I9641 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726. 
31. Note 13 supra. 
32. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 10,88th Cong., 2d Sess., 38 (1964), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES 
(CCH) 7 5348, at 5356 (July 27, 1964). 
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This seems to contemplate use of the subpoena power to gather 
information in response to a treaty request even though no do- 
mestic taxes are involved. 
The Treasury Regulations issued pursuant to the 1942 Tax 
Treaty with Canada are not helpful in this context inasmuch as 
they merely echo the wording found in the exchange of informa- 
tion articles of the treaty.33 Regulations to other treaties are simi- 
larly ~nhelpful.~'  However, the IRS argued in the instant case 
that its position was approved by the State and Treasury Depart- 
ments and represented the consistent United States interpreta- 
tion of the treaty.35 
The validity of the Government's interpretation of the 
United States tax treaties is supported by the League of Nations 
and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) model income tax convention drafts. The League of Na- 
tions Fiscal Committee sponsored model drafts in 1943 and 
1946." Both drafts provide for the exchange, subject to reciprocity 
and on special request, of "such information in matters of taxa- 
tion as the competent authorities of each State have a t  their 
disposal or are in a position to obtain under their [revenue] 
laws."37 The commentary to the drafts reads: 
The information that may be applied for under this article 
may be in the hands of the administration to which the request 
is directed or it may have to be secured from an outside source. 
This source may be the party concerned himself or persons who, 
as a result of their relations with the taxpayer, can give informa- 
tion about his affairs, or resort may have to be made to experts 
or witnesse~.~~ 
The securing of information from outside sources, it seems, would 
involve use of the subpoena power. 
33. Treas. Reg. Q 519.120 provides: 
Under the provisions of Article XXI of the convention and upon request of 
the Minister, the Commissioner may furnish to the Minister any information 
available to, or obtainable by, the Commissioner under the revenue laws relative 
to the tax liability of any person (whether or not a citizen or resident of Canada) 
under the revenue laws of Canada. 
34. E.g., id. 6 520.118 (Sweden); id. 6 514.116 (France). 
35. 525 F.2d at 15. 
36. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, FISCAL COMMITTEE, LONDON AND MEXICO MODEL TAX CONVEN- 
TIONS, COMMENTARY AND TEXT (1946), reprinted in 4 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX. CONV., supra 
note 21, at 4319,4326. 
37. Id. a t  100, 101. 
38. Id. a t  49. 
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  he OECD model draft was promulgated in 1966.39 Both the 
United States and Canada are members of the 0ECD,40 and the 
United States has sought to amend many of its treaties to con- 
form to the OECD model.41 The commentary to the OECD draft 
indicates that upon request for information by one contracting 
State, the other State must use the same administrative mea- 
sures that it would use in investigating its own taxes, even though 
information is sought solely to aid the requesting State.'* The 
commentary indicates that these measures include special inves- 
tigations and examinations of business  account^.'^ The Treasury 
Department has also adopted a model treaty which embodies 
these same requirements." This model specifically allows for the 
furnishing of depositions and copies of unedited documents such 
as books and records.45 
II. INSTANT CASE 
The district court could find nothing in the 1942 Tax Treaty 
or section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code that authorized use 
of the IRS subpoena power solely to aid a Canadian tax investiga- 
tion. Focusing on the phrase in 7602, "determining the liability 
of any person for any internal revenue tax," the court concluded 
that "internal revenue tax" meant "United States tax" and that 
the section 7602 subpoena power should be limited to investiga- 
tions involving domestic tax liabilities. Inasmuch as the treaty 
contemplated use only of existing IRS subpoenas, the court rea- 
soned that the IRS could supply Canadian authorities only with 
information already in possession of the IRS or that might be 
obtained in the course of legitimate domestic tax  investigation^.'^ 
In reversing, the court of appeals felt that such a limited 
construction of section 7602 would frustrate the purposes of the 
- - 
39. ORGANIZATION F R ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT DRAFT CONVENTION 
FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION WITH RESPECT O TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as OECD DRAFT], reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 7 151 
(1966). 
40. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 1975). 
41. Surrey, Factors Affecting U.S. Treasury in Conducting International Tax 
Treaties, 28 J .  TAX. 277, 277 (1968). 
42. United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 16 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting the 
commentary to the OECD draft). 
43. Id. 
44. UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY, art. 26 (1976), reprinted in 2 TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) fi 9767 (1976). 
45. Id. 
46. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. fi 9779, at 85,562. 
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Canadian and other similar tax treaties. The court stated that 
one of the treaty's purposes was to provide for the exchange of 
whatever information might be obtained under the administra- 
tive laws of each country in order to prevent fiscal evasion. The 
court concluded that even though section 7602 was written to 
apply to United States tax liabilities, it should not be construed 
to exclude use of the very procedures to which the treaty refers. 
Therefore, the court read the treaty as allowing the IRS to use the 
same procedures and techniques in investigating exclusively 
Candian tax liabilities as could be used in American tax investi- 
gations." The court found support for this interpretation of the 
treaty in the canon of construction that treaties should be broadly 
construed to give effect to their purposes and that when a provi- 
sion admits of two constructions, one restricting and the other 
enlarging rights that may be claimed under it, the more liberal 
interpretation is to be preferred.48 The court also considered sec- 
tion 7852(d)'s provision that no part of the Internal Revenue Code 
should be applied in opposition to any prior treaty obligation and 
concluded that the district court's narrow reading of section 7602 
would be contrary to the treaty and thus unenf~rceable.~~ 
Evidence was presented to the court that Canadian authori- 
ties do not interpret the treaty to mean that they are required to 
subpoena records solely to aid an American tax investigation." 
The appellees argued that the treaty should be construed in light 
of the Canadian interpretation and that the United States should 
not be obligated to provide any more information than Canada 
would provide to the United States. The court rejected these 
arguments, stating that the official United States interpretation 
was not that of the Canadian authorities, and that even if Canada 
did not fulfil its treaty obligations as viewed by the United States, 
the court still had to sanction fulfillment of American obligations 
until such time as the treaty might be denounced. Therefore, the 
court concluded that the Canadian interpretation of the treaty 
was not relevant in the instant case.51 
47. 525 F.2d at 13, 14. 
48. Id. at 14. 
49. Id. 
50. In a telephone interview on October 29, 1976, a spokesman for the Canadian 
Ministry of Revenue denied that Canada interprets the treaty differently from the United 
States in regard to the subpoena power. It was asserted that the decision in i;he instant 
case is consistent with Canadian practice in responding to requests for information by the 
United States under the treaty. Telephone interview with A.C. Bonneau, Director of the 
International Relations Division, Canadian Ministry of Revenue (Oct. 29, 1976). 
51. 525 F.2d at 14-15. 
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The court also considered the model income tax treaty pro- 
mulgated by the OECD. The appellees read the information ex- 
change provisions of the OECD draftJ2 as not requiring use of the 
subpoena power in the instant case and argued that the United 
States and Canada must interpret the 1942 treaty consistently 
with the OECD draft since no attempt has been made to amend 
the 1942 treaty since publication of the OECD draft in 1966." 
However, the court found the OECD provisions and the accompa- 
nying commentary to be consistent with the interpretation placed 
on the 1942 treaty by the IRSJ4 
The legislative history of the treaty was only briefly consid- 
ered by the court in a footnote a t  the end of the opinion.55 The 
court found most of the history to be unenlightening except for 
the exchange quoted aboveJ6 between Senators George and Taft, 
which it found to support the Government's position. 
The conclusion that the 1942 Tax Treaty with Canada au- 
thorized use of the subpoena power in the instant case was correct 
inasmuch as it accords with the legislative history of the treaty 
and general principles of treaty construction. The interpretation 
should have come as no surprise to those familiar with the OECD 
draft and the new United States Model Treaty. However, the 
instant decision raises serious questions as to the operation of the 
exchange of information provisions in United States tax treaties. 
A. Implications of the Decision 
The decision in the instant case will probably stand as the 
interpretation not only of the 1942 Tax Treaty with Canada but 
of all the tax conventions with similar exchange of information 
 provision^.^^ The court regarded its decision as necessary to avoid 
frustrating all the tax conventions with comparable exchange 
 provision^,^' and in view of the similarity of the provisions in all 
the treaties there is little to suggest that contrary interpretation 
by other courts is likely. As a result, American taxpayers- 
52. OECD DRAFT, supra note 39, art. 26. 
53. On May 13, 1976, the Treasury Department announced that negotiations on a 
new treaty were underway with Canada. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,427. 
54. 525 F.2d at 15-17. 
55. Id. at 17 n.7. 
56. Text accompanying note 29 supra. 
57. Note 5 supm. 
58. 525 F.2d at 13 n.2. 
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particularly large corporations with international dealings- 
may have their records subpoenaed by the IRS at the request 
of any of twenty-two or more countries. 
This prospect is especially disconcerting in view of the recent 
Supreme Court decision in United States u. Bisceglia." In 
Bisceglia, the IRS had learned that a federal reserve bank had 
received from a bank in Kentucky two large deposits of badly 
deteriorated $100 bills. Suspecting that the bills represented 
transactions that had not been reported for tax purposes, the IRS 
issued a "John Doe" summons to the Kentucky bank calling for 
production of all books and records that would provide informa- 
tion as to the unknown depositor of the bills. When the bank 
refused to comply, the IRS sought judicial enforcement. The dis- 
trict court narrowed the subpoena to include only large deposits 
of $100 bills during a one-month period and enforced it as modi- 
fied. Although the Sixth Circuit reversed,'O the Supreme Court 
upheld enforcement of the subpoena, holding that the IRS has 
statutory authority to issue a "John Doe" summons to discover 
the identity of a person involved in transactions suggesting the 
possibility of liability for unpaid taxes." 
The full import of Bisceglia is not yet clear. Justice Black- 
mun in his concurring opinion emphasized that Bisceglia is a 
narrow decision involving a specific investigation where it was 
virtually certain that only one individual or entity was involved 
in transactions strongly indicating tax liability and thus does not 
authorize an exploratory search where "neither a particular tax- 
payer nor an ascertainable group of taxpayers is under investiga- 
t i~n ." '~  Justice Stewart, however, maintained that "[alny pri- 
vate economic transaction is now fair game for forced disclosure, 
if any IRS agent happens in good faith to want it dis~losed."~ At
the least it is clear from the opinion that the subpoena power is 
not limited to "investigations which have already focused upon 
a particular return, a particular named person, or a particular 
potential tax liabilit~."'~ 
This broadening of the IRS power, which has caused alarm 
59. 420 U.S. 141 (1975). 
60. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 141 (1975). 
61. 420 U.S. at 144, 151. Other cases sanctioning use of a "John Doe" summons 
include United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Turner, 
480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. 
denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964). 
62. 420 U.S. at 151-52 (Blackmun & Powell, J.J., concurring). 
63. Id. at 159 (Stewart & Douglas, J.J., dissenting). 
64. Id. at 149. 
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in its potential domestic a p p l i c a t i ~ n , ~ ~  is even more alarming if 
extended through tax treaties to foreign governments to give 
them this same ability to investigate unknown taxpayers and pry 
into suspicious transactions. If not limited i t  would grant foreign 
nations an awesome power to delve into the affairs of American 
citizens. At the same time, to the extent that foreign nations 
make treaty requests in cases where American tax liability is 
lacking, the IRS will gain access to otherwise unavailable infor- 
mation. There are considerations, however, that may limit the 
above effects. 
B. Possible Limitations on the Use of Section 7602 
In making requests for information under tax treaties, most 
countries will likely be motivated by diplomatic considerations to 
make their requests as reasonable as possible. In addition, a cer- 
tain amount of discretion seems to be vested in the IRS in carry- 
ing out treaty requests for i n f o r m a t i ~ n , ~ ~  and thus the IRS can 
also be expected to screen these requests and gather information 
in the least intrusive manner. To the extent that these practical 
limitations are ineffective, the courts should also be able to act 
to curtail extreme or unfair use of the IRS subpoena power. One 
limiting factor may be found by the courts in the reciprocal na- 
ture of treaty obligations; others may be found in the existing 
statutory and case law that provides for judicial enforcement of 
subpoenas. 
1. Reciprocity 
The court in the instant case rejected the notion that if Can- 
65. Note, IRS Subpoena Power to Investigate Unknown Taxpayers, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
177, 195 (1975): 
Bisceglia, read in the broadest possible way, permits the IRS to subpoena 
documents concerning the possible tax liability of any taxpayer, known or un- 
known. . . . If the requirement of an investigation is not linked to the presence 
of a particular person, and the statute is read a t  its broadest, third parties such 
as banks could be required to produce virtually any records concerning taxpay- 
ers a t  the third party's expense and with relatively little potential value to the 
IRS or the public policy of revenue collection. . . . Since practically everyone 
falls within the "regulation" of the IRS, since income tax liability reflects vir- 
tually all of one's finances, and since most of one's life can be connected in some 
way to these finances, the IRS would have an awesome ability, far greater than 
that of any other governmental agency, to delve into individual lives and harass 
third parties. Protection is required for the general public as well as for those 
directly involved in the transactions. 
66. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY, art. 26 (1976), reprinted in 
2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 7 9767 (1976). 
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ada refused to carry out its treaty obligations the United States 
would be excused from its reciprocal  obligation^.^^ But a different 
reciprocity limitation exists in the exchange of information arti- 
cles of the United States Model TreatyG8 and the OECD draft,6g 
which provide that a party to the treaty is not required to carry 
out administrative procedures that vary from its laws or practice 
or from the-laws or practice of the other contracting country or 
to supply information that could not be obtained under the laws 
of the other country. These provisions embody reciprocity of obli- 
gation by placing the exchange of information on a least common 
denominator basis. Thus, a country with a narrower subpoena 
power than the United States could not take advantage of the 
broader measures available to the IRS; and countries whose ad- 
ministrative measures do not include "John Doe" summonses 
would not be able to take advantage of Bisceglia. 
This limitation clearly exists in the newer treaties, which are 
similar to the OECD and United States model treaties,70 and in 
some of the older treaties." But it may not apply to the 1942 
treaty with Canada, since it contains no "lowest common denom- 
inator" provision. Inasmuch as treaties both before and after the 
1942 United States-Canada Treaty contained the limiting provi- 
~ i o n , ~ ~  it appears that the exchange of information with Canada 
was not meant to be strictly reciprocal. However, the United 
States and Canada are currently negotiating a new income tax 
c ~ n v e n t i o n , ~ ~  and since both are members of the OECD, it is 
likely that the new treaty will include the "lowest common de- 
67. Note 51 and accompanying text supra. 
68. UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY, art. 26 (1976), reprinted in 2 TAX 
TREATIES (CCH) fi 9767 (1976). 
69. OECD DRAFT, supra note 39, art. 26. 
78. The exchange of information provisions of the treaties with Belgium (art. 26), 
Finland (art. 29), France (art. 261, Iceland (art. 29), Japan (art. 26), and Norway (art. 
28) are substantially similar to those of the model treaties. Note 5 supra. 
71. The treaties with Sweden (art XX) and Greece (art. XX), supra note 5, contain 
least common denominator provisions similar to those in the model conventions. 
72. In addition to the treaties indicated in notes 70 & 71 supra, two obsolete treaties 
contained the lowest common denominator provision. Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation, July 25,1939, United States-France, art. 24,59 Stat. 893, T.S. No. 988; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Oct. 28, 1948, United States-Belgium, 
art. XVIII, [I9531 4 U.S.T. 1647, T.I.A.S. No. 2833. 
A 1945 convention with the United Kingdom did not contain the provision even 
though it was recognized that the British system of information gathering was less compre- 
hensive than that of the United States. Report of the Secretary of State on S. Exec. D., 
79th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 16, 1945, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX CONV., supra 
note 21, at 2577. 
73. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,427 (1976). 
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nominator" provisions of the OECD draft,74 in which case a reci- 
procity limitation will exist upon requests for information by 
Canadian authorities. 
The least common denominator provisions limit the mea- 
sures that the IRS is obligated to use to gather inf~rmation.'~ It
is not clear whether the IRS may go beyond what it is strictly 
required to do; for instance, whether the IRS could use a "John 
Doe" summons even though the requesting country does not uti- 
lize such an administrative measure. It seems, however, that in 
cases where the recipient of an IRS summons challenges the sum- 
mons on grounds of improper purpose or overbreadth, the courts 
could restrict the IRS to using only those procedures that are 
required under the tax treaty. Whether the courts will do so re- 
mains to be seen. 
2. Judicial enforcement 
Under section 7604 of the Internal Revenue Code, an IRS 
summons to produce records must be enforced through the fed- 
eral district courts if resisted by the re~ipient. '~ This provides an 
opportunity for the recordholder to challenge the summons on 
any applicable grounds.77 A limited discovery may be allowed if 
neces~ary, '~ and enforcement orders are appealable." Further- 
more, the Supreme Court has stated that to obtain enforcement 
of a summons the IRS must show that (1) the investigation will 
be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, (2) the inquiry 
is relevant to the purpose, (3) the information sought is not al- 
ready within the Commissioner's possession, and (4) the adminis- 
trative steps required by the Code have been f o l l ~ w e d . ~ ~  
Presumably, all of the above conditions will apply with equal 
force when the subpoena is issued for the purpose of providing 
foreign tax authorities with requested information. Thus the 
74. As members of the OECD, the United States and Canada must notify the OECD 
of the reasons why they do not adopt any provision of the OECD draft in any tax conven- 
tion between them. 4 LEG. HIST. OF U.S. TAX CONV., supra note 21, a t  4704. 
75. Notes 68 & 69 supra and accompanying text. 
76. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 
371-72 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 510 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975). 
77. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440,449 (1964); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 
368, 372 (3d Cir. 1975). 
78. United States v. Lomar Discount Ltd., 61 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd. 498 
F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974). 
79. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). 
80. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). 
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courts can require that the requesting country provide sufficient 
underlying information to justify its request for information and 
to ensure that the court's process is not abused.81 This is not per 
se a limitation on the use of Bisceglia by foreign governments, but 
it will a t  least permit the courts to pass on the reasonableness of 
a "John Doe" summons and to limit or refuse to enforce it if, in 
the court's opinion, such limitation or refusal is warranted. 
3. Discretionary judicial limitation 
a. Burdensomeness. In a number of recent cases involving 
the subpoenaing of large numbers of bank records, the banks 
complained that  compliance with the summonses entailed an 
unreasonable financial burden.82 Most of the courts were not very 
sympathetic to the plea of financial burden as justification for 
withholding enforcement of the summonses, and following the 
reasoning of the court in United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust 
C O . ~ ~  that  "the recipient of a summons has a duty of cooperation 
and . . . a t  least up to some point must shoulder the financial 
burden of cooperation," they found that the financial burdens 
were not excessive or unreas~nable .~~ Even though financial bur- 
den generally will not excuse compliance with an IRS summons, 
it may call forth special protection by the courts. In United States 
v. Friedman,85 it was held that courts have the power to require 
the IRS to reimburse a summons recipient for the cost of produc- 
ing requested records.86 Enforcement of the summons may even 
81. Id. a t  5 8  
Nor does our reading of the statutes mean that under no circumstances may the 
court inquire into the underlying reasons for the examination. It  is the court's 
process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court 
may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the 
summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the tax- 
payer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other 
purposes reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. (footnote 
omitted). 
82. E.g., United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dauphin 
Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968). 
83. 385 F.2d 129, 130 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968). 
84. Id. a t  130. See also United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 530 F.2d 45, 
48 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jones, 351 F. Supp. 132, 134 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
85. 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976). 
86. Id. a t  938. See also United States v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp. 
418, 421 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (holding that bank should not have to bear more than nominal 
costs). But see United States v. Mellon Bank, 410 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
In passing on the need for reimbu/sement, the courts have not focused on specific dollar 
limits; rather they have discussed the overall reasonableness of the burdens imposed on 
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be conditioned on the payment of such costs by the IRS?' 
The bank cases suggest the use of a balancing testRu in deter- 
mining the burden that recordholders should be required to bear 
in complying with a summons. The need of the IRS for the mate- 
rial and the duty of the one having the material to cooperate with 
the IRS are to be weighed against the right of the person to be 
free from unreasonable impositions by the government. A special 
application of the balancing test in tax treaty cases is suggested 
by United States u. Harrington," where the c o u j  stated that 
judicial protection against sweeping or irrelevant orders is partic- 
ularly appropriate in cases where a subpoena is directed not to 
the taxpayer but to a third party who happened to have dealings 
with the taxpayer. 
In cases where the IRS is seeking information solely in re- 
sponse to a foreign request pursuant to a tax treaty, the courts 
should be especially sensitive to the burden placed on the recipi- 
ent of the summons; consequently, the balancing test should be 
weighted more favorably in the recipient's favor. If there is a duty 
to cooperate with the IRS in its administration of the tax laws, 
that duty is not as strong when the laws are those of a foreign 
power. And if judicial protection is appropriate for a third party 
receiving a subpoena, that protection is even more appropriate 
when the subpoena is issued a t  the request of foreign tax authori- 
ties. The fact that twenty-two or more countries may be able to 
request information through the IRS dictates that the courts ex- 
ercise controls over the burdens placed on those who possess the 
information to protect them from unreasonable impositions. 
b. Privacy. The dissent in United States v. Bisceglia ex- 
pressed concern that the summons in that case would involve the 
deposit slips of many innocent depositors and thus apprise the 
IRS of their identities?O The concern that a summons would in- 
fringe on the privacy of uninvolved parties and give the IRS un- 
the summons recipient. Where the cost involved is not beyond that which the recipient 
may be reasonably expected to bear as a cost of doing business, the summons will be 
enforced without reimbursement. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d a t  938. Willingness 
on the part of the IRS to furnish labor or copiers may also be relevant. United States v. 
Mellon Bank, 410 F. Supp. a t  1069. 
87. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 937 (3d Cir. 1976). 
%.-United States v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp. 418, 420 (C.D. Cal. 
1975). See also Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 203-04, 213 (1946). 
89. 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); accord, United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 
754 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1973), 
aff'd, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 946 (1975). 
90. 420 U.S. a t  156 n.2. 
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warranted access to information was dealt with rather cursorily 
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Conti- 
nental Bank & Trust C O . ~ ~  In that case, the court simply stated 
that although a search of the bank records of uninvolved parties 
had not been justified as relevant to a legitimate purpose, the 
bank had not suggested that the IRS was "attempting to investi- 
gate indirectly persons whom it could not investigate directly."92 
A similar problem arises when the IRS subpoenas records 
solely to aid a foreign government's investigation where there is 
no potential tax liability. In such a situation there is no legitimate 
purpose beyond that of satisfying a treaty request to justify the 
investigation. Accordingly, if the IRS is allowed to examine the 
subpoenaed records or to record the information before passing it 
on to the requesting country, then the IRS is being allowed to 
"investigate indirectly persons whom it could not investigate di- 
rectly," and governmental access to private information is corre- 
spondingly increased. 
A strong collective private interest exists in minimizing the 
opportunities for the IRS to pry into private affairs and in curtail- 
ing the flow of information into government computer banks.93 
The possible infringement of that interest in situations such as 
the instant case suggests that action similar to that of the district 
court in United States v. Friedman" may be appropriate. In that 
case, where IRS agents would have seen the bank records of many 
uninvolved parties in the course of their investigation, the judge 
held that the IRS had to pay to have the bank's employees search 
the records and extract the relevant i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~  In tax treaty 
cases a further order could be made limiting the right of the IRS 
to examine or copy the records before passing them on to the 
requesting country. 
91. 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974). 
92. Id. at 50. 
93. One author, after noting the broad range of uses, both proper and improper, that 
can be made of information obtained by the IRS (e.g., criminal prosecutions, exchanges 
with other federal agencies, political purposes, and harassment) said: 
In federal tax investigations, therefore, it is not only the private interest of 
a particular individual or group to be free from harassment which must be 
placed on the scale . . . . Rather, it is the collective private interest of all 
citizens in keeping potentially enormous investigative power within bounds 
which is to be considered. 
Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An Appraisal of the Investigative 
Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. Rev. 657, 664-65, 667 
( 1965) (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). 
94. 388 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
95. Id. at 970. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
If the interpretation given the 1942 Tax Treaty with Canada 
by the Second Circuit is applied to the twenty-one other tax 
treaties currently in force, a broad power will be created for for- 
eign governments to inquire into the affairs of Americans. The 
courts can limit these effects somewhat, but the greater responsi- 
bility rests with the legislative and executive branches. It seems 
doubtful that all the ramifications of the exchange of information 
provisions have been considered by those involved in the negotia- 
tion or ratification of the tax treaties. The subpoena power is 
perhaps a necessary adjunct to the information exchange provi- 
sions in cases where there is no domestic tax liability. If the power 
is necessary, Congress should take appropriate action to limit the 
conditions under which information is available and the methods 
by which it is to be collected and transmitted. Legislation could 
be passed to require that the Government bear all costs incident 
to collecting requested information. This would alleviate much of 
the burden on those who have their records subpoenaed. The IRS 
could also be required to use only Office of International Opera- 
tions9' personnel to gather and transmit information to requesting 
countries; the communication of information to other branches of 
the IRS could be prohibited. This would prevent the IRS from 
using treaty requests from foreign governments as a tool to gather 
information for its own purposes. Finally, a body outside the IRS 
might be created to screen incoming requests in order to ensure 
that foreign nations are not using the tax treaties for improper 
purposes such as prying into American business and private deal- 
ings. 
96. The Office of International Operations is the branch of the IRS primarily involved 
in handling matters arising under the tax treaties. 1 INT. REV. MANUAL (CCH) 1033-3 
( 1976). 
